St. Augustine and Goodness in Human Nature

In another post we saw that St. Augustine disagrees with certain forms of the Reformed/Presbyterian doctrine of total depravity. Some folks think that non-Christians are completely incapable of doing anything that God would view as good. This is not St. Augustine’s view.

It is no trifling matter that even before the merit of good works, the soul has received a natural power of judgment by which it prefers wisdom to error and peace to difficulty, so that it achieves these not simply by being born, but instead by its own endeavor. If the soul is not willing to act, it may justly be regarded as sin, for it has not put to good use the faculty that it received. For although it was born in ignorance and difficulty, nevertheless it is not compelled by necessity to remain in the state in which it was born. [On Free Choice of the Will, III.xx, p. 131-132]

If we are created so that we prefer wisdom to error, which is a good thing, it cannot be said to be evil or wicked when a man pursues wisdom. Of course it is possible for a man to “fail” to find wisdom deliberately, by prejudiced searching or deliberately hiding from it; but if we have free will as St. Augustine insists throughout the book, then it cannot be the case that we are compelled to shun wisdom.

This isn’t to say, of course, that a man may merit initial justification. It is to say that it is irrational to suggest that non-Christians never do good; it is to say that to hold that the non-Christian cannot do good is decidedly not an Augustinian view: “even before the merit of good works” a man has some powers for good. They cannot save him, of course, but that is not why God gave them to us.

St. Augustine on Invincible Ignorance

St. Augustine believes that some unbelievers seem to have a valid appeal to ignorance.

Although there is One present everywhere who in many ways through His creation beckons to hostile servants, instructs believers, comforts those who hope, encourages those who work, aids those who try, and hears those who pray, you are not considered at fault if you, against your will, are ignorant; however, if you are ignorant because you fail to ask, you are at fault. You are not blamed because you do not bind up your wounded limbs. Your sin is that you despise Him who wishes to heal you. No one is denied the knowledge of how to seek advantageously what, to his disadvantage, he does not know, and how he must humbly confess his stupidity, so that He who neither errs or toils when he comes to give aid may help the man who seeks and confesses. What a man through ignorance does not do rightly, and what he cannot do, even though he wills rightly, are called sins because their origin lies in free will. … [W]e call sin not only what is properly called sin because it is committed from free will and in full knowledge, but even that which must follow from the punishment of sin. Thus we speak of nature in one way when we refer to man’s nature as he was first created, faultless in his own class; and we speak of it in another way when we refer to the nature into which, as a result of the penalty of condemnation, we were born mortal, ignorant, and enslaved by the flesh. Of this the Apostle says, “We also were by nature the children of wrath, as were the others.” [On Free Choice of the Will, III.xix, pp. 129-130; emphasis added]

It seems here that he means to say that Original Sin is not sin properly speaking, because it is not associated with any deed on our part arising from free will and full knowledge. But along the way he acknowledges that a man is not blameworthy if through no fault of his own he is not a Christian. This seems to me to be consistent with Romans 2, and it is consistent with the teaching of the Catholic Church. It is certainly not consistent with at least some forms of Protestantism; there are some who deny that God extends any grace at all to those who are not Christian; there are some who insist that by original sin “we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil.” It seems clear that such men are at variance with St. Augustine’s words above.

He says something pretty similar a few pages later.

Therefore, if blessedness for us consisted of fine speech and if it were considered a crime to err in speech and grammar in the same way as when we err in the activities of living, no one would denounce an infant because it set out from this point to pursue eloquence. Clearly, however, a man would rightly be condemned if by the perversity of his will he had either returned to babbling like an infant, or had remained at that first stage. So even now, if ignorance of the truth and difficulty in behaving rightly are the natural points from which man begins his ascent toward the blessedness of wisdom and tranquility, no one properly condemns the soul because of its natural origin. But if a man refuses to strive for excellence, or wills to step back from where he set out, he justly and properly suffers punishment.

The Creator of man is in all respects to be praised: whether because from the beginning He instills in man the capacity for the highest good, or because He aids man in attaining this good, or because He completes and perfects man’s progress; and He justly ordains the justest condemnation for sinners—either those who, from the first, refuse to strive for achievement, or those who slip back from a higher state—according to their just deserts. Besides, we cannot say that God created an evil soul on the basis of the argument that it is not so great as it has the power to be if it advances… [p. 138]

Natural ignorance isn’t culpable.

Augustine and Free Will, part 2

And I directed my attention to discern what I now heard, that free will was the cause of our doing evil, and Your righteous judgment of our suffering it. But I was unable clearly to discern it. So, then, trying to draw the eye of my mind from that pit, I was plunged again therein, and trying often, was as often plunged back again. But this raised me towards Your light, that I knew as well that I had a will as that I had life: when, therefore, I was willing or unwilling to do anything, I was most certain that it was none but myself that was willing and unwilling; and immediately I perceived that there was the cause of my sin. [Confessions, VII.3]

If we do not have free will, it is not possible for us to sin—because it is the cause of sin (as St. Augustine says here). That is not to say that we are compelled to sin by virtue of the fact that we have free will (which would contradict the very idea of free will), but rather that if we did not have free will, we could not sin.

Liars at the Door

Today we had a pair of LDS missionaries come to the door. They've been here before, but this was the first occasion when I happened to be the one to answer the door.

After the initial pleasantries of establishing where we all stand (introducing themselves as LDS missionaries, and I for my part introducing myself as Catholic) they said that they were interested in [rough paraphrase here] "helping people come closer to Christ." I informed them that I appreciated their sincerity, but that we were not interested in becoming LDS.

And this is the point at which the story gets a little ugly, at least in my opinion. Because they both assured me that they weren't really interested in making converts.

Yes, they said that.

Well, I had to argue with them to get them to admit what they were really doing. They're missionaries. This means that they have a mission (hence the name), and that mission is to make more LDSers. So they had to concede that, yes, that's what they're really doing. So then I told them once again that we're not interested in converting. And off they went.

What the heck is going on with LDS missions if their missionaries are lying to people? Frankly, I find it hard to believe that this was an incidental offhand remark: I'm pretty sure they are sufficiently well-trained in their spiel that this was unlikely to be an innocent gaffe by a newbie. Indeed, given the fact that they never send out two newbies together but rather pair up the greenhorns with veterans (which is a sensible approach), and given that they both initially insisted they weren't trying to make converts, it seems very likely that they were trained this way.

I'm pretty shocked and disgusted by the whole thing. I don't mind them coming to my door as much as I do the fact that they were apparently trained to lie to me.

Beware the LDS missionary. He's represents a "gospel" that is contrary to the Catholic Faith, and he will apparently lie to you in order to get you to join up.

[Update]: I'm pretty bothered by this lying bit, so I did a little Googling. First hit: here. The author, apparently a former LDSer who is now a Protestant, says that he told more lies as an LDS missionary in the 1970s than he can remember. Number one on his list: "We're not trying to convert you." He continues:

I didn't trade the Southern California sunshine for the Dakota snow merely to build interfaith relations. My calling was to teach the church-approved missionary lessons and then baptize the people I taught.

Of course it was. And a little honesty is a lot better way to say hello than lying to my face.

Theology of St. Thomas - Definition of Sin

Having considered his definition of moral virtue, we now turn to St. Thomas' definition of sin. Here he quotes (and then defends) St. Augustine.

Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law (ST I-II Q71 A6).

St. Thomas is not the only one to have followed St. Augustine on this score. The CCC (1849) quotes them both on this subject. And here is what the Westminster Shorter Catechism (considered a standard of faith by conservative Presbyterians and others) says:

Q. 14. What is sin?
A. Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God.

But It is not enough, as Aquinas says in response to objection 5 for this article in the Summa, that sin might be better defined as being contrary to reason. While it is certainly true that many sins are contrary to reason, this is an insufficient standard.

The theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to reason. Hence Augustine defines sin with reference to its being "contrary to the eternal law," more fittingly than with reference to its being contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g. in matters of faith (ST, ibid.; ad 5).

The Christian faith is not rationalistic. It cannot be circumnavigated by reason, and it cannot be fully comprehended by reason either. But it is possible for a man to sin in regard to matters of faith - as when a Catholic denies a dogma of the Church such as the Trinity, which cannot be known by reason. Therefore it would be unreasonable to limit sin to those matters which are comprehensible by reason.

Long Knives

Once upon a time a man named Kevin Johnson popped in here at The Supplement to register his disagreement with those who consider converting to Catholicism to be intellectual suicide. At that time, Mr. Johnson said:

I want to first register my disagreement with such a comment as well as let your readers know that such a reaction is not the only way our contributors react to such moves to Rome.

Whether that is true of Mr. Johnson's fellow contributors or of the general readership of his blog is one thing. But recently Mr. Johnson has provided personal testimony that - whatever others at "Reformed Catholicism" may think about it - he does indeed seem to consider conversion to the Catholic Church to be an act of intellectual penury at best, and maybe worse.

In my view, converting to Rome is the most Protestant of all acts. Returning to Mother Church in America is a return to the fundamental identity of Protestantism for it is only in a conscious turning of the mind toward Rome that one fully realizes the power of what some have termed "private interpretation" (source).

Now how can one be exercising an act of intellectual integrity if - according to Mr. Johnson - at the very moment when he is rejecting private interpretation in converting to the Catholic Church, he is nevertheless performing "the most Protestant of all acts" and "fully realizing" its "power"? Fine, Mr. Johnson. It may not be intellectual suicide by your lights, but your supposed irenicism flies out the window when you paint the convert as ignorant or cognitively dissonant (or both) - and that is exactly what your view expressed above does.

But even worse than this, in the same post (and in the ensuing comments) on his blog Mr. Johnson goes on to describe the abomination of the pedophile scandals as being perpetrated "by the authority of Rome."

At least we understand things - or rather, we understand Mr. Johnson - a bit more clearly. But an abuse of authority is a usurpation of authority, not an exercise of it. And notwithstanding the disgusting, revolting, vile, blasphemous evils that have been done by some in positions of authority in the Catholic Church, it is no less absurd to condemn the Church as an institution for this evil than it is to condemn the United States government as an institution because of the evils perpetrated by some of our leaders. It would be no less absurd to condemn Mr. Johnson's congregation or his session or his presbytery or his denomination as irrational because of the silly things he just said as a pastor of that congregation, and as an elder in that session and presbytery and denomination.

Maybe it's too much to hope for, but I'd like to think that we can move on from silly Donatism like this, where we imagine ourselves as somehow holier than others, and where we fancy that some group of Christians larger than none can be free of sin. The question has to do not with whether there is evil to be seen here or there. Whether we see it or not, it's probably there in some form or other, to some degree or other, wherever we loook. The question has to do with Christ and salvation and truth.

An Answer for Turretinfan

By this post I hope to fulfill my promise to Turretinfan to answer his question. The question-before-the-question was:

are you saying that some people who enter heaven will have unforgiven sins?

Now this is a straightforward question. Unfortunately in a discussion between a Catholic and Protestant it becomes slightly more complicated by a distinction that we Catholics make; even more unfortunately, things became more complicated (at least in my tomfool head, if not for poor Turretinfan) by my weakness of comprehension in this particular area. I don't have any particular defense to offer for myself beyond these: first, that I am a relatively recent convert to the Catholic Church, and second, that it takes time to shed the intellectual "baggage" one accumulates after many years in a different theological tradition.

But I digress.

The first part of my reply to Turretin's question was straightforward:

Mortal sins must be forgiven or one cannot enter heaven.

The second part is where - due to the baggage and incomplete catechesis mentioned above - I made things difficult for myself:

It would appear, based upon what I have cited from Trent and St. Thomas, that venial sins also must be forgiven, and apart from this one cannot enter heaven (links inserted here from a previous comment).

Now strictly speaking that answer is correct but imprecise, inasmuch as it obscures the distinction between venial and mortal sins. By mortal sin, we mean those grave sins which men commit by which they sever themselves from God and make themselves liable to eternal punishment in hell and to temporal punishment here in this life. By venial sin, we mean those less serious sins that men commit which do not sever us from God, do not make us liable to hellfire, but which do merit temporal punishment. Venial sins must either be forgiven, or expiated in some other fashion, or the temporal punishment due to them will be measured out in Purgatory. This is necessary because we must be actually holy in order to see the face of God.

Who can ascend the mountain of the Lord? or who may stand in his holy place? He whose hands are sinless, whose heart is clean, who desires not what is vain, nor swears deceitfully to his neighbor (Ps. 24:3-4).

Hence in Purgatory such guilt is purged if it has not already been dealt with. Now Turretinfan has said that he's familiar with the distinction we make between mortal and venial sins, so I'm not going to belabor this section with documentation. I wanted to go into a bit more detail here, though, in order to clarify what I said before.

Turretinfan's followup to my answer above was this:

The follow-on question is: why?

If a sin does not render the sinner guilty, why would the sinner be forgiven - indeed - what sense does forgiveness have apart from guilt?

I think, if I have understood the question correctly, and done my homework sufficiently, the correct answer is: venial sin does render one guilty - but not guilty of an offense meriting eternal punishment.

All who die in God's grace and friendship, but still imperfectly purified, are indeed assured of their eternal salvation; but after death they undergo purification, so as to achieve the holiness necessary to enter the joy of heaven (CCC 1030).

The punishment of purgatory is not intended chiefly to torment but to cleanse (Summa Theologica, Supp. Q97 A1 ad 2).

From the conclusions we have drawn above (III, 86, 4-5; Supplement, 12, 1) it is sufficiently clear that there is a Purgatory after this life. For if the debt of punishment is not paid in full after the stain of sin has been washed away by contrition, nor again are venial sins always removed when mortal sins are remitted, and if justice demands that sin be set in order by due punishment, it follows that one who after contrition for his fault and after being absolved, dies before making due satisfaction, is punished after this life. Wherefore those who deny Purgatory speak against the justice of God: for which reason such a statement is erroneous and contrary to faith. Hence Gregory of Nyssa, after the words quoted above, adds: "This we preach, holding to the teaching of truth, and this is our belief; this the universal Church holds, by praying for the dead that they may be loosed from sins." This cannot be understood except as referring to Purgatory (ST, Supp. App. II A1).

So: those venial sins of Christians on their way to heaven that have not been forgiven in this life will be cleansed in Purgatory. The man in this condition does not enter heaven with unforgiven sin; but if his sins are merely light or venial then they only delay his entry into glory. Mortal sins however are not of this sort; the man who dies in mortal sin goes to hell.

Now of course I know that Turretinfan rejects this formulation, but I hope that it helps both to clear up any confusion generated by my prior imprecision and to answer his question (and if I have still missed it, well...then I'll just have try again!)

I think it may be that some additional confusion might have been injected by the context in which our conversation began: over the question of whether people are actually guilty when in genuine and unintentional ignorance they commit acts that would otherwise (i.e., if they had known what they were doing) be mortally sinful. But acts committed in unintentional ignorance, or left undone because of the same (as in his hypothetical case), are not by Catholic lights sinful acts (cf. CCC 1860). So they would not ordinarily even enter into a discussion of mortal and venial sins - at least, not as far as the Catholic is concerned.

From the Combox: Involuntary Sin

Turretinfan remarks:

I was unaware that modern Roman Catholics (unlike Augustine and the Orthodox) do not seek forgiveness of involuntary sins.

That's a very serious problem (if it is true) with Roman Catholic theology.

That is not precisely the case, but the misunderstanding may have been a failure on my part to communicate more clearly. In the post of mine that is in question, I was addressing the specific circumstances of a hypothetical situation that Turretinfan had proposed. I was not intending to present details as to the different categories of sin that Catholics recognize.

The Church distinguishes between mortal and venial sins. Mortal sin is that which, if committed, severs one from Christ:

Mortal sin destroys charity in the heart of man by a grave violation of God's law; it turns man away from God, who is his ultimate end and his beatitude, by preferring an inferior good to him...

Mortal sin, by attacking the vital principle within us - that is, charity - necessitates a new initiative of God's mercy and a conversion of heart which is normally accomplished within the setting of the sacrament of reconciliation...

For a sin to be mortal, three conditions must together be met: "Mortal sin is sin whose object is grave matter and which is also committed with full knowledge and deliberate consent."

Grave matter is specified by the Ten Commandments...

Mortal sin requires full knowledge and complete consent. It presupposes knowledge of the sinful character of the act, of its opposition to God's law. It also implies a consent sufficiently deliberate to be a personal choice. Feigned ignorance and hardness of heart do not diminish, but rather increase, the voluntary character of a sin. ...

Unintentional ignorance can diminish or even remove the imputability of a grave offense. But no one is deemed to be ignorant of the principles of the moral law, which are written in the conscience of every man. the promptings of feelings and passions can also diminish the voluntary and free character of the offense, as can external pressures or pathological disorders. Sin committed through malice, by deliberate choice of evil, is the gravest. ...

Mortal sin is a radical possibility of human freedom, as is love itself. It results in the loss of charity and the privation of sanctifying grace, that is, of the state of grace. If it is not redeemed by repentance and God's forgiveness, it causes exclusion from Christ's kingdom and the eternal death of hell, for our freedom has the power to make choices for ever, with no turning back. However, although we can judge that an act is in itself a grave offense, we must entrust judgment of persons to the justice and mercy of God (CCC 1855-1861 passim).

Contrasted with this are venial sins:

One commits venial sin when, in a less serious matter, he does not observe the standard prescribed by the moral law, or when he disobeys the moral law in a grave matter, but without full knowledge or without complete consent. ...

Deliberate and unrepented venial sin disposes us little by little to commit mortal sin. However venial sin does not set us in direct opposition to the will and friendship of God; it does not break the covenant with God. With God's grace it is humanly reparable. "Venial sin does not deprive the sinner of sanctifying grace, friendship with God, charity, and consequently eternal happiness."

[Quoting St. Augustine:] While he is in the flesh, man cannot help but have at least some light sins. But do not despise these sins which we call "light": if you take them for light when you weigh them, tremble when you count them. A number of light objects makes a great mass; a number of drops fills a river; a number of grains makes a heap. What then is our hope? Above all, confession (CCC 1862-1863 passim).

We actually ought to confess venial sins as well, as St. Augustine notes in the quotation above; also:

Without being strictly necessary, confession of everyday faults (venial sins) is nevertheless strongly recommended by the Church. Indeed the regular confession of our venial sins helps us form our conscience, fight against evil tendencies, let ourselves be healed by Christ and progress in the life of the Spirit. By receiving more frequently through this sacrament the gift of the Father's mercy, we are spurred to be merciful as he is merciful (CCC 1458).

But I am somewhat at a loss to know which things Turretinfan considers to be "involuntary sins" in the context of the post in question, such that he would be surprised by what I said.

It seems rather obvious (well, to me anyway; I don't mean to be flip or critical: I am just perplexed by his reaction) that one couldn't be held responsible for a physical inability to do some positive good: A quadriplegic cannot be expected to plunge into the swimming pool to save a drowning child. By the same token, a genuinely deceived man can hardly be held to blame for being unaware that his "priest" is not really a priest. Consequently the fact that he has not actually received the sacraments that he should ordinarily receive can hardly be reckoned blameworthy.

If, on the other hand, Turretinfan would consider truly wicked the case of a man who (in genuine ignorance) sleeps with a woman while falsely believing that she is his wife: again, I don't see how this would constitute a mortal sin. Materially the act would be construed as adultery (i.e., relations with some other than one's rightful spouse), but in consideration of the circumstances it is not formally so because the action lacked consent and knowledge. Perhaps a slightly similar analogy would be that of the altar built by the Transjordan tribes, which materially was a violation of the Law, but in consideration of the circumstances - namely, the intent of the altar's builders - was not reckoned to have been a sinful act (Josh. 22:10ff). So: it's not merely the matter of the action (sleeping with someone other than one's rightful spouse/building an altar) but also (among other things) the intent (sleeping with one's spouse/erecting a witness) that determines the sinfulness of the act.