I'm going to have to agree with Mr. Shea

Mark Shea has been standing tall for years for an unconditional condemnation by Catholics of the "enhanced interrogation methods" (aka "torture") of the Bush Administration. I have no particular inclination to jump into the fray at this late date, just because he, and Zippy, and others have been doing the heavy lifting and anything I would say would be (at best) piling on or (at worst) trivial in comparison.

One thing I'd like to add my "Hear hear!" to, though, has to do with our attitude towards the prohibition of torture. Although this post doesn't address it specifically, in the (gigantic) combox it comes up again.

Rather than asking, "What are the limits on extraordinary interrogation? What can we do to suspects or prisoners without crossing the line into torture?" We should simply treat them humanely. Period. If you do that, you don't have to worry about the rest. What does "humane" demand? It demands charity, and it demands doing unto others as we would have them do unto us.

It seems to me that to ask "How far can we go with interrogation techniques"-type questions is indistinguishable from the Pharisaic attitude that resulted in questions like "How far can I walk on a Sabbath without violating the Sabbath?" The "Sabbath day's journey" resulted from this.

Don't ask what harm you can do. Just don't. And don't do harm, either.

Or so it seems to me.

Liars at the Door

Today we had a pair of LDS missionaries come to the door. They've been here before, but this was the first occasion when I happened to be the one to answer the door.

After the initial pleasantries of establishing where we all stand (introducing themselves as LDS missionaries, and I for my part introducing myself as Catholic) they said that they were interested in [rough paraphrase here] "helping people come closer to Christ." I informed them that I appreciated their sincerity, but that we were not interested in becoming LDS.

And this is the point at which the story gets a little ugly, at least in my opinion. Because they both assured me that they weren't really interested in making converts.

Yes, they said that.

Well, I had to argue with them to get them to admit what they were really doing. They're missionaries. This means that they have a mission (hence the name), and that mission is to make more LDSers. So they had to concede that, yes, that's what they're really doing. So then I told them once again that we're not interested in converting. And off they went.

What the heck is going on with LDS missions if their missionaries are lying to people? Frankly, I find it hard to believe that this was an incidental offhand remark: I'm pretty sure they are sufficiently well-trained in their spiel that this was unlikely to be an innocent gaffe by a newbie. Indeed, given the fact that they never send out two newbies together but rather pair up the greenhorns with veterans (which is a sensible approach), and given that they both initially insisted they weren't trying to make converts, it seems very likely that they were trained this way.

I'm pretty shocked and disgusted by the whole thing. I don't mind them coming to my door as much as I do the fact that they were apparently trained to lie to me.

Beware the LDS missionary. He's represents a "gospel" that is contrary to the Catholic Faith, and he will apparently lie to you in order to get you to join up.

[Update]: I'm pretty bothered by this lying bit, so I did a little Googling. First hit: here. The author, apparently a former LDSer who is now a Protestant, says that he told more lies as an LDS missionary in the 1970s than he can remember. Number one on his list: "We're not trying to convert you." He continues:

I didn't trade the Southern California sunshine for the Dakota snow merely to build interfaith relations. My calling was to teach the church-approved missionary lessons and then baptize the people I taught.

Of course it was. And a little honesty is a lot better way to say hello than lying to my face.

Philosophy of St. Thomas - Summa Contra Gentiles - Providence Includes Evil

I can't speak for others on this subject, but it would not surprise me if there were other Protestants who (like me, prior to my conversion) have sorely deficient ideas about the consequences of the Fall. Maybe there are Catholics who suffer from the same problem; I don't know. The problem I mean is the mistake of supposing that prior to the Fall, there were neither defects nor other things that we might describe (loosely) as "evil" in the world. On this supposition, anything "bad" or flawed or "evil" is attributed in the final analysis to the consequences of Adam's sin. St. Thomas provides a healthy antidote for such thinking in the Summa Contra Gentiles. It's worth noting that at least part of his argument rests on the fact that Providence includes the working of secondary causes.

Indeed, divine governance, whereby God works in things, does not exclude the working of secondary causes, as we have already shown. Now, it is possible for a defect to happen in an effect, because of a defect in the secondary agent cause, without there being a defect in the primary agent. For example, in the case of the product of a perfectly skilled artisan, some defect may occur because of a defect in his instrument. And again, in the case of a man whose motive power is strong, he may limp as a result of no defect in his bodily power to move, but because of a twist in his leg bone. So, it is possible, in the case of things made and governed by God, for some defect and evil to be found, because of a defect of the secondary agents, even though there be no defect in God Himself.

[Summa Contra Gentiles, III-71, 2]

God does not ordinarily govern the world immediately - that is, by directly ordering the course of events. Rather, he normally accomplishes his purposes through secondary causes. This is not unlike the king who does not take the city himself, but who gives orders for it to be done (and then it is done). But secondary causes - like us, for example - are not perfect like God is. We are limited in our powers and gifts and abilities. And we are the pinnacle of the natural world - so how much more are other creatures similarly limited. This does not mean that God's purposes are thwarted because he works them through creatures; rather, his greatness is such that his purposes are fully accomplished even through creation's limitations. But this means that there will necessarily be flaws and defects in creation, because man's knowledge and experience is limited.

But defect and evil are not in creation merely by man's action. For example, mushrooms may only grow in decomposing material. But that means that something must be decomposing - like a tree, for example. But this presupposes the presence of death in creation. Similarly, there are bacteria which feed on decaying matter, and there are trees which depend upon forest fires for the release of their seeds. But this presupposes that there will be fires to release them - and the associated death of many trees. And these fires must be caused somehow - as by lightning, for example. And of course there is the more obvious example of carnivorous animals. How can this be?

Moreover, perfect goodness would not be found in created things unless. there were an order of goodness in them, in the sense that some of them are better than others. Otherwise, all possible grades of goodness would not be realized, nor would any creature be like God by virtue of holding a higher place than another. The highest beauty would be taken away from things, too, if the order of distinct and unequal things were removed. And what is more, multiplicity would be taken away from things if inequality of goodness were removed, since through the differences by which things are distinguished from each other one thing stands out as better than another; for instance, the animate in relation to the inanimate, and the rational in regard to the irrational. And so, if complete equality were present in things, there would be but one created good, which clearly disparages the perfection of the creature. Now, it is a higher grade of goodness for a thing to be good because it cannot fall from goodness; lower than that is the thing which can fall from goodness. So, the perfection of the universe requires both grades of goodness. But it pertains to the providence of the governor to preserve perfection in the things governed, and not to decrease it. Therefore, it does not pertain to divine goodness, entirely to exclude from things the power of falling from the good. But evil is the consequence of this power, because what is able to fall does fall at times. And this defection of the good is evil, as we showed above. Therefore, it does not pertain to divine providence to prohibit evil entirely from things.

[ibid., 3]

In other words, a creation with a variety of degrees of goodness and perfections is inherently better than one that lacks this variety. But such a variety means that there will be defects, and events that we would be inclined to call bad. And there is more:

Again, the best thing in any government is to provide for the things governed according to their own mode, for the justice of a regime consists in this. Therefore, as it would be contrary to the rational character of a human regime for men to be prevented by the governor from acting in accord with their own duties—except, perhaps, on occasion, due to the need of the moment-so, too, would it be contrary to the rational character of the divine regime to refuse permission for created things to act according to the mode of their nature. Now, as a result of this fact, that creatures do act in this way, corruption and evil result in things, because, due to the contrariety and incompatibility present in things, one may be a source of corruption for another. Therefore, it does not pertain to divine providence to exclude evil entirely from the things that are governed.

[ibid., 4]

One obvious example that comes to mind are things like parasites - leeches, mosquitoes, tapeworms, and other loathsome things. We call them evil, but they are part of the created order. So are diseases. And sometimes, we would not enjoy certain good things apart from evil:

Furthermore, many goods are present in things which would not occur unless there were evils. For instance, there would not be the patience of the just if there were not the malice of their persecutors; there would not be a place for the justice of vindication if there were no offenses; and in the order of nature, there would not be the generation of one thing unless there were the corruption of another. So, if evil were totally excluded from the whole of things by divine providence, a multitude of good things would have to be, sacrificed. And this is as it should be, for the good is stronger in its goodness than evil is in its malice, as is clear from earlier sections. Therefore, evil should not be totally excluded from things by divine providence.

[ibid., 6]

And it's not just virtues that we would lack opportunity to exercise without evil. Jack pines would have ceased to exist without fires to release their seeds. Mushrooms (ahh, portobellos!) would not exist without organic matter on which to grow. Dragonflies feed on mosquitoes. Monarch butterfly caterpillars feed on milkweed. These are good things that we only enjoy thanks to things that we are accustomed to consider as evil.

It is in this way, then, that St. Thomas offers a theodicy vindicating the Lord our God.

Now, with these considerations we dispose of the error of those who, because they noticed that evils occur in the world, said that there is no God. Thus, Boethius introduces a certain philosopher who asks: "If God exists, whence comes evil?" [De consolatione philosophiae I, 4]. But it could be argued to the contrary: "If evil exists, God exists." For, there would be no evil if the order of good were taken away, since its privation is evil. But this order would not exist if there were no God.

[ibid., 10].

"For as the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are my ways exalted above your ways, and my thoughts above your thoughts" (Isaiah 55:9). I must say, though, that Brussels sprouts are unquestionably a result of the Fall.

(That's a joke, son.)

Philosophy of St. Thomas - Evil Part 2

In part 1, I looked at St. Thomas' view that evil is a privation, which follows from the fact that the good and being are the same thing. One question that might reasonably follow from this position is whether evil can possibly be found in a thing if evil is a privation?

Objection 2. Further, "being" and "thing" are convertible. If therefore evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is a thing, which is contrary to what has been said.

Objection 3. Further, "the white unmixed with black is the most white," as the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 4). Therefore also the good unmixed with evil is the greater good. But God makes always what is best, much more than nature does. Therefore in things made by God there is no evil (ST I Q48 A2).

St. Thomas replies that since the perfection of the universe requires inequality in things, and since differences of goodness imply privations of one sort or another, there are necessarily evils of various sorts in creation.

As, therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that there should be not only beings incorruptible, but also corruptible beings; so the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some which can fail in goodness, and thence it follows that sometimes they do fail. Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact that a thing fails in goodness. Hence it is clear that evil is found in things, as corruption also is found; for corruption is itself an evil (ibid.; emphasis added).

An incorruptible being in Aquinas' reckoning is one that does not change, because corruption is a species of change: hence, by incorruptible beings, he means angels.

St. Thomas' reply to Objection 3 above is worth including here:

God and nature and any other agent make what is best in the whole, but not what is best in every single part, except in order to the whole, as was said above. And the whole itself, which is the universe of creatures, is all the better and more perfect if some things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes fail, God not preventing this. This happens, firstly, because "it belongs to Providence not to destroy, but to save nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); but it belongs to nature that what may fail should sometimes fail; secondly, because, as Augustine says (Enchir. 11), "God is so powerful that He can even make good out of evil." Hence many good things would be taken away if God permitted no evil to exist; for fire would not be generated if air was not corrupted, nor would the life of a lion be preserved unless the ass were killed. Neither would avenging justice nor the patience of a sufferer be praised if there were no injustice (ibid., ad 3).

There is no getting around the fact that in some sense there is "evil" in the world as created by God. The perfection of the whole is what must be in view when God says in Genesis that the creation was "very good", since there are different degrees of perfection among creatures.

I think what St. Thomas says about God not "destroying" but "saving" nature is very powerful. We are not puppets on a string, which would be contrary to our nature as God's image-bearers and moral agents. It's this sort of thing that highlights the figurative language of Isaiah 65:25:

The wolf and the lamb shall feed together; the lion and the ox shall eat straw; and dust shall be the serpent's food: they shall not hurt nor kill in all my holy mountain, saith the Lord.

It's contrary to a lion's nature to eat straw; Isaiah does not mean to say that carnivores will become herbivores, but rather he is saying something about the radically different sort of peace and harmony that will characterize the new heavens and the new earth (v. 1). As the editors of the CCD Bible say about Isaiah 11:6-9:

This picture of the idyllic harmony of paradise is a dramatic symbol of the universal piece and justice of Messianic times.

Until then - until there is a new heavens and a new earth - we find imperfection in this world, and corruption that is a feature of how God made the world. That's why we have maggots and worms and buzzards: to clean up the corruption. The world works, and it is very good.

Philosophy of St. Thomas - Evil Part 1

Before we can properly understand what St. Thomas has to say about evil, we have to understand what he says about good.

One opposite is known through the other, as darkness is known through light. Hence also what evil is must be known from the nature of good (ST I Q48 A1).

By all means feel free to go to the source for this subject; otherwise, you can take a look at my modest attempt to understand what he says about it here.

Since (as St. Thomas says) "goodness and being are really the same," it follows that evil cannot be a being, since this would make good and evil the same thing - which is irrational. Hence we must conclude that evil is really privation, or "the absence of good:"

Now, we have said above that good is everything appetible; and thus, since every nature desires its own being and its own perfection, it must be said also that the being and the perfection of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies being, or any form or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying that "evil is neither a being nor a good." For since being, as such, is good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other (ST I Q48 A1; emphasis added).

Aquinas goes on to explains this a bit more in the same article, and I think what he has to say is instructive for understanding his philosophy on this point. With respect to good and evil in morality, he says:

Good and evil are not constitutive differences except in morals, which receive their species from the end, which is the object of the will, the source of all morality. And because good has the nature of an end, therefore good and evil are specific differences in moral things; good in itself, but evil as the absence of the due end. Yet neither does the absence of the due end by itself constitute a moral species, except as it is joined to the undue end; just as we do not find the privation of the substantial form in natural things, unless it is joined to another form. Thus, therefore, the evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined to the privation of another good; as the end proposed by the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but the delight of sense without the order of reason. Hence evil is not a constitutive difference as such, but by reason of the good that is annexed (emphasis added).

I'm not sure I know a way to put this into other words that will make sense, explain it, and accurately reflect what he says here, but if I understand him correctly the point is that evil in morality isn't simply defined by the absence of the due end, but rather by that deprivation in association with some other "good" in place of the due end: as when we prefer some pleasure or other in the place of the good that reason rightly identifies. The evil in stealing isn't simply that I steal, but rather that I put my own craving for another man's goods ahead of the other man himself, irrationally supposing that I "deserve" or "have a right" to his things, or (even more irrationally) ignoring such questions entirely and just taking his stuff "because I want it" - as though it is good to be ruled by our desires rather than by the reason that God has given us. In the latter case especially, it seems pretty easy to see that I would have put another thing that I perceive as "good" - the irrational, immoderate satisfaction of my desires - ahead of the real goods of contentment with my own possessions and respect for my neighbor's goods as his. The privations I can see here are my discontent with my lot, my lack of respect for my fellow man's right to private property, and a lack of self control with respect to my desires for his things.

It might be worth pointing out here one implication of this doctrine: it is not possible to will to do evil. Because evil is a privation of good or being, it makes no sense to think of doing evil as something that we want to do. Rather, what we do is substitute some other thing we perceive as good for the good we ought to want to do.

A thing is said to act in a threefold sense...[I]t is said in the sense of the final cause, as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause. But ... evil does not effect anything of itself, that is, as a privation, but by virtue of the good annexed to it. For every action comes from some form; and everything which is desired as an end, is a perfection. And therefore, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Evil does not act, nor is it desired, except by virtue of some good joined to it: while of itself it is nothing definite, and beside the scope of our will and intention."

What we will to do is something that we desire. Our desires may be disordered, so that we identify as a good thing that which is not really, but we don't really say, "This is evil, and I want to do it." Even Satan himself does not do so: what he has done is decide that fulfillment of his own desires is more important than obeying God, and so he refuses to do what God commands. Now we may, if we step back and consider things from a rational perspective, identify these things as evil; but to the man who is sinning, what he is actually doing is not choosing to do evil per se but rather to pursue something that he has decided is good to pursue - even better, in his own eyes, than the good he ought to be pursuing. The privation is the lack of the due end in what we have chosen to do.

Lastly for this post (I hope to have more to say about St. Thomas' views on evil), it's interesting to me that the Reformed Protestant Westminster Shorter Catechism has echoes of this formulation of evil in its answer to the question, "What is sin?"

Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God (WSC Question 14; emphasis added).

Sin here is defined (at least partly) as a failure to conform to God's law: in other words, as a privation. The Reformers owed more to Aquinas and the Scholastics than they would probably ever have been willing to concede. :-)

It's easy (and in some contexts reasonable) to think about good and evil as contraries or opposites. But St. Thomas shows us that we need to be more cautious in our thinking about this. Evil isn't a contrary per se, because that would suggest that it has some existence; but as we have seen, good and being are really the same (says St. Thomas), and so evil really doesn't have any existence.